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*Clark  
Mason*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Executive Secretary, USCSB

SUBJECT: Appendix I, Parts 1 and 2 of the Hoover  
(General Mark Clark) Report

1. You requested me to give you the comments and recommendations of CIA with respect to those portions of subject report dealing with COMSEC matters. They are as follows:

Appendix I, Part 1

Recommendation #4

1. THAT THE MILITARY SERVICES AND NSA CONTINUE TO STRIVE FOR A HIGHER DEGREE OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY.

2. THAT THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY INCLUDING PLAIN TEXT MESSAGES AND TRAFFIC ANALYSIS OF ENCRYPTED MESSAGES, BE RESTUDIED BY USCSB (OR THE COMBINED BOARD AS RECOMMENDED IN THE REPORT) WITH A VIEW TOWARD REDUCING TO THE LOWEST PRACTICABLE LEVEL THE QUANTITY OF INFORMATION RELEASED THROUGH TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

3. THAT NSC 168 BE REEXAMINED TO ASCERTAIN IF THE DIRECTOR, NSA, HAS SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT HIS COMSEC RESPONSIBILITIES.

CIA Comments and Recommendations

1. There is no question concerning this aspect of the recommendation. Since the development of cryptographic equipment is primarily the responsibility of NSA, recommendations to increase their capabilities in this field should be made by them.

2. USCSB should be responsible for the study. A subcommittee should be established under USCSB to conduct the study, within the limitations of NSC 168, and to make the necessary recommendations.

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25 JUN 1983

**SUBJECT:** Appendix I, Parts 1 and 2 of the Hoover (General Mark Clark) Report

The recommendations should include a statement of policy, which can be later issued as a USCSB or NSC directive: (1) establishing the authority to prescribe minimum standards for the development of communications procedures which will provide and maintain transmission security, and (2) requiring the various departments and agencies of the Government to submit periodic reports to USCSB which will indicate that they have examined their communications security systems, procedures and practices and have determined that they are operating in conformance with the prescribed minimum standards.

3. The above subcommittee should also be charged with the responsibility for reexamining NSC 168.

**Recommendations #5**

1. THAT A SINGLE BOARD WITH APPROPRIATE SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE POLICY COGNIZANCE OVER COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY. IF THE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PLACE THE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF ELINT UNDER NSA IS ADOPTED, THEN POLICY GUIDANCE FOR ELINT AS WELL AS COMINT AND COMSEC SHOULD BE EXERCISED BY THE PROPOSED SINGLE BOARD.

**CIA Comments and Recommendations.**

1. It is believed that it is inadvisable at this time to establish a single board as recommended. Although many of the matters which are of interest to USCSB are also of interest to USCIB, the primary functions and responsibilities of these two boards are sufficiently divergent to justify their separate existence.

**Appendix I, Part 2**

**Recommendation #8**

THAT THE PRESENT BASIC COMMUNICATIONS (CRYPTOGRAPHIC) SECURITY PLAN, PROVIDING FOR CENTRALIZED CONTROL WITH EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZATION OF OPERATIONS, BE CONTINUED; THAT EACH AGENCY AND SERVICE MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE INSPECTION AND VIGOROUS TRAINING PROGRAMS TO REDUCE TO THE MINIMUM CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIOLATIONS.

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**SUBJECT: Appendix I, Parts 1 and 2 of the Hoover (General Mark Clark) Report**

**CIA Comments and Recommendations**

**Concur**

**Recommendation #9**

**THAT NSC DETERMINE WAYS AND MEANS TO CONTROL MORE EFFECTIVELY RELEASE OF VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE TO POTENTIAL ENEMIES VIA CLEAR TEXT MESSAGES BEING TRANSMITTED OVER GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS.**

**CIA Comments and Recommendations.**

The responsibility to provide additional controls on the use of clear text messages should be assigned to the USCSB and not to the NSC as this is a responsibility clearly within the charter of the USCSB. (In the event agreement cannot be reached, procedure prescribed in paragraph 1g of NSC 168 will apply.)

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